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OF SECRETARIES, ANALYSTS AND PRINTERS: SOME
REFLECTIONS ON INSIDER TRADING
Stanley M. Beck*

In Dirks v. SEC,' the U.S. Supreme Court continued the
it began some three years earlier in Chiarella v. United
process
States2 of limiting the reach of Rule 10b-5 3 to traditional insiders
- directors, senior officers and their tippees. In so doing, it has
placed itself in sharp opposition to a continuing campaign by the

Securities and Exchange Commission (hereafter "SEC") to
extend the civil and criminal sanctions of the Rule to all those

who trade in the securities markets with knowledge of a material
fact that they4 know, or ought reasonably to know, has not been

made public.
It is remarkable to those schooled in the Anglo-Canadian legal
tradition that the entire jurisprudence of insider trading in the
Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I am grateful to Philip Anisman
and Mark Connelly for helpful comments and suggestions and for saving me from error
in my interpretation of the Canadian Business Corporations Act (hereafter "CBCA")
provisions.
1103 S.Ct. 3255 (1983).
2445 U.S. 222 (1980).
3 17 C.F.R., s. 240. lOb-5 (1980). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
4The SEC has placed before the U.S. Congress the Insider Trading Sanctions Act (HR
559) which gives power to the Commission to seek treble damages from any person
convicted of insider trading. Criminal penalties are increased from $10,000 to $100,000.
The Bill was passed by the House of Representatives on September 19, 1983.
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United States springs out of judicial and administrative interpretation of a legislative rule that in its own terms does not deal with
insider trading and, arguably, was never intended to do so. 5 One
advantage of such a judicially created offence 6 is the ongoing
debate it engenders between regulators, practitioners, academics
and judges as to the proper scope of insider trading regulation. It
is that debate, which has been intensified by the decisions in
Chiarella and Dirks, that is of most interest in the context of

Canadian securities law for under the Ontario Securities Act
(hereafter "OSA"),7 civil and criminal liability for insider trading
has been extended beyond traditional insiders to include a wide
class of those deemed to be in a "special relationship" with a

reporting issuer. 8 And the definitions for civil liability in the
CBCA 9 are even broader than those in the OSA. Little, if any,

public discussion accompanied these extensions and it will be the
purpose of this article to ask, in the context of Dirks and
Chiarella, whether the OSA and the CBCA have moved too far,

or whether there is yet room for further inclusion.
The initial judicial decisions with respect to insider trading
liability under Rule 10b-5 were in the context of face-to-face

transactions and were confined to traditional insiders - directors, officers and majority shareholders. 10 Thus it could be argued
that normal fiduciary duty theory was being applied to a securities
trading context. It was a decision of the SEC itself, in Cady,
Roberts & Co.," that extended insider liability to impersonal
5 See the comment on the legislative history of Rule lOb-5 in Dooley, "Enforcement of
Insider Trading Restrictions", 66 Va.L. Rev. 1 (1980), at pp. 56-9. See also, Loss,
Fundamentals of Securities Regulation (Little, Brown & Co., 1983), pp. 820-3. Section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C., s. 78(b) prohibits short-swing profits
(six months) by defined insiders. Liability to the issuer does not depend on a showing of
possession of material non-public information. The fact of buying and selling or selling
and buying within the defined period is conclusive.
6 It may be that only an academic would see it as an advantage; those who work in the
world of securities, whether as registrants or legal advisers, may have another view of the
matter. A very serious disadvantage, of course, is the law's uncertainty. The SEC's
Enforcement Director, John Fedders, has recently announced that he now supports a
definition of the prohibited conduct. The SEC has officially opposed a definition on the
ground that it would be unduly limiting: 15 B.N.A. Secs. Reg. and Law Report 2261
(1983).
7 R.S.O. 1980, c. 466.
8 Ibid., ss. 75, 118(c), 131.
9 S.C. 1974-75, c. 33, s. 125(1), as amended.
10Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D.Del., 1951); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa., 1947).
" 40 SEC 907 (1961). In Cady, Roberts, a director of the Curtis-Wright Corporation, who
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stock exchange transactions. Although the judgment spoke of the
special obligation that traditionally has been required of
corporate insiders, and on the facts is within that tradition, it did
note that such insiders "do not exhaust the classes of persons
upon whom there is such an obligation". The Commission stated
that the obligation rests on two principal elements:
...first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly,
to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose ...
second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of
such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing. 12

Judicial affirmation of the Cady, Roberts doctrine came with
the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur (hereafter "TGS"). 13 Although
once again the officers and employees involved were within the
traditional category of fiduciaries, the court echoed the "equal
access" theory of Cady, Roberts:
.. the Rule [10b-5] is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the
securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges
have relatively equal access to material information. ... 14

A step forward taken in TGS was the imposition of liability on a
non-trading tipper, following on the liability visited on a trading
tippee in Cady.15 The "disclose or abstain" holding of Cady and
TGS was subsequently extended from corporate insiders and
their tippees to those who, because of a special relationship with
the corporation, were privy to material, confidential information.
Included in this category were lawyers and accountants, 16 brokerdealers and underwriters, 17 and those who acquired information
in the course of negotiations with the company. 18
was also a principal in the registrant Cady, informed one of the firm's partners of a
decision by the Curtis-Wright board to cut its dividend. The firm and the selling partner

were held liable for selling Curtis-Wright shares on the basis of the tip.
12 Ibid., at p. 912.

13 401 F. 2d 833 (2d Cir., 1968), cert. denied 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
14 Ibid., at p. 848.
15Judicial affirmation of the SEC-imposed liability on the tippee in Cady was given in
Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (SDNY, 1967).
16 Dirks,

supra, footnote 1 at p. 3261, note 14; see also Loss, supra, footnote 5 at p. 831
and note 39 citing Myzel v. Fields, 386 F. 2d 718 (8th Cir., 1967), at p. 739; Sec. Ex. Act
Rel. 13, 437, 11 SEC Dock. 2231 (1977).

17 Shapiro v.

Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 495 F. 2d 228 (2d Cir., 1974).
Shapiro was also important for the fact that it was a private suit for damages and the

court had to decide who had standing to sue. For the Second Circuit's later resolution of
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The above, in very brief compass, 19 was the state of the law

with respect to insider trading when the U.S. Supreme Court
considered the matter for the first time in Chiarella.20 The
uniqueness of Chiarella was that the Second Circuit imposed
liability on an individual who had received his information from a
source outside the corporation. 21 In short, the equal access theory
of Cady and TGS was being tested in a framework that did not
contain the usual picture of fiduciaries and their participants. The
essential facts of the case were that a printer, Vincent Chiarella,
while employed by a financial printing firm in New York, worked
on documents with respect to five proposed takeover bids. The

names of the offerors and the target companies were coded to
preserve confidentiality. Chiarella deciphered the name of the
offeree company in each case by piecing together information in
the documents and purchased their shares. When the bids were
announced, he sold the shares at a substantial profit. Chiarella

informwas convicted of wilful misuse of material, non-public
22

ation and on appeal the Second Circuit affirmed.
Chief Judge Kaufman, for the majority, noted that Chiarella
was not an insider but held that the reach of Rule lOb-5 extended
beyond insiders to include "market insiders" who were defined
inclusively as "Anyone - corporate insider or not - who
regularly receives non-public information". 23 Judge Kaufman
based his holding on the court's pronouncement in TGS to the
effect that the Rule is based on the "justifiable expectation ...
that all investors ... have relatively equal access to material
information". 24 In terms of harm to the market-place, he emphathat issue see Elkind v. Liggett and Myers, Inc., 635 F. 2d 156 (2d Cir., 1980). For a
contrary opinion by the Sixth Circuit, see Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F. 2d 307 (6th Cir.,
1976).
18 Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F. 2d 787 (2d Cir., 1969).
19 The analysis of Rule lOb-5 is almost endless in the American legal literature as commentators have attempted to follow the weaving pathways of the federal courts in interpreting and applying such terms as "fraud" and "in connection with" to a wide variety
of securities transactions. With respect to insider trading, a helpful guide is found in
Langevoort, "Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement", 70 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1982).
20 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
21588 F. 2d 1358 (2d Cir., 1975).
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., at p. 1365 (emphasis in original). A major difficulty in Judge Kaufman's formulation is to determine those who "regularly" receive confidential information.
24 Ibid. Chiarella argued that he was not within the "disclose or abstain" rule of TGS as he
did not owe a fiduciary duty to the offeree shareholders.
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sized that "the most unscrupulous officer or director" would not
profits than did Chiarella by
have a greater opportunity to reap
25

virtue of his market information.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed 26 and rejected the Second
Circuit's test of "regular access to market information". Mr.

Justice Powell, for the majority, held that for there to be
actionable fraud under Rule 10b-5 there "must be a duty to

disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence

between parties to a transaction". 27 Absent a fiduciary duty, there
was no obligation to disclose prior to trading. 28 Chiarella was a
"complete stranger" to the sellers and the court was unwilling to
recognize "a general duty between all participants in market

transactions to forego actions based on material non-public

information". 29 An important question left open in the case was
whether Chiarella's breach of duty to his employer and his
could be
employer's customers by using confidential information
30
the basis of criminal liability under the Rule.
Within a relatively short period, the Supreme Court considered
25 Ibid. "Market information", as opposed to "corporate information" refers to information that affects the price of a company's securities without reference to the company's
assets or earning power, e.g., a proposed takeover bid. See Fleischer, Mundheim and
Murphy, "An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information",
121 U. Pa.L.Rev. 798 (1973).
26 Supra, footnote 20.

27 Supra, footnote 20 at p. 230.
28 The court noted with approval that liability had been extended to tippees on the basis of
their "role as participant after the fact in the insider's breach of fiduciary duty", supra,
footnote 20, at p. 230, note 12. The court also agreed with the holding in Cady, Roberts
& Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961), that an insider owed a duty to purchasers who were not
previously shareholders even though there was no pre-existing duty, on the basis that
the purchase transaction brought them into such a relationship. See, supra, footnote 20
at p. 227, note 8.
29 Supra, footnote 20, at p. 232.
30 The question was left open because the majority felt that the matter had not been
properly put to the jury at the trial. The question was squarely faced by the Second
Circuit in the subsequent case of U.S. v. Newman, 664 F. 2d 12 (2nd Cir., 1981), cert.
denied 52 U.S.L.W. 3240 (1983). The court held that the misappropriation of nonpublic information by an employee was "fraud" for the purposes of criminal prosecution
under Rule 10b-5. It was not necessary that the fraud actually be perpetrated on
purchasers or sellers of securities. In a subsequent civil action by a seller of the target
company's shares, the Second Circuit, following Chiarella and Dirks, held that the
defendant had no duty to disclose his knowledge of the impending tender offer since he
was not an insider of the target and had no special relationship to the purchaser: Moss v.
Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F 2d 5 (2d Cir., 1983); a petition for certiorarihas been filed,
U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 83-950, 12/8/83.
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it necessary to express its views again on the reach of Rule 10b-5
to catch insider trading. The facts in Dirks v. SEC3 were very
different and a good deal more controversial than those in
Chiarella. Dirks was an officer of a registered broker-dealer that
dealt primarily with institutional investors. Dirks' own specialty
was the insurance industry. In March, 1973, he received a
telephone call from Ronald Secrist, who had recently been fired
from his job as an officer of one of the subsidiaries of Equity
Funding Corporation of America (hereafter "Equity Funding"),
an insurance holding company. Secrist informed Dirks that he
had information with respect to major fraud at Equity Funding.
Dirks then conducted his own investigation, including the
questioning of some employees and senior officers and an
industry-comparative analysis of the group's operating results,
and confirmed to his satisfaction the truth of Secrist's allegations.
During his two-week investigation, and particularly after he
had substantiated Secrist's information, Dirks informed a number
of his institutional clients of his findings. They sold some $15.5
million in Equity Funding stock prior to a halt in trading imposed
by the New York Stock Exchange on March 27th. 32 The SEC's
Enforcement Division brought disciplinary proceedings against
Dirks and five of his institutional clients who sold Equity Funding
stock. An administrative law judge found that Dirks had violated
Rule 10b-5 by communicating inside information and suspended
him for 60 days. 33 Dirks appealed and the SEC held that as he had
received information from insiders which he knew was material
and non-public and had communicated that information to
clients, he had wilfully aided and abetted a violation of the
Rule. 34 However, it reduced the sanction to a censure.
At first blush, the case seems an unremarkable one of a tippee
31Supra, footnote 1.
32 The SEC subsequently suspended trading in Equity Funding and an investigation
showed fraud on a massive scale and the company went into receivership. A Los
Angeles federal grand jury subsequently returned a 105-count indictment against 22
persons, including many of Equity Funding's officers and directors. All defendants were
found guilty on one or more counts. See Dirks, supra, footnote 1 at p. 3259, note 4.
33 The four institutions were found guilty of trading on inside information and were
censured. They did not appeal.
34 Professor Loss, in noting that Dirks, in passing on information that he had received as
tippee, was held to have violated the Rule as an aider and abettor of his tippees' illegal
sales, asks the question whether the aiding and abetting doesn't run the other way from tippee (Dirks, the secondary violator) to tipper (Secrist, the primary violator in his
fiduciary capacity); Loss, supra, footnote 5 at p. 843, note 67.
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making use of the information passed to him by an insider. 35 On
further appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
SEC. 36 Judge Wright, after noting that two different theories, the
"information" theory (as exhibited in the Second Circuit's
decision in Chiarella) and the "fiduciary" theory, underlay the
insider trading opinions, recognized that the Supreme Court in
Chiarellahad opted for the narrower fiduciary theory. And Dirks
argued that neither he nor his informants had any duty to keep
their information confidential with respect to the fraud. Absent
such a duty they were free, within the holding of Chiarella, to
trade without disclosing. Judge Wright disagreed and held that
Rule 10b-5 may require fiduciaries to disclose material information they have acquired as fiduciaries before trading or tipping,
even if it would not
be a breach of their fiduciary duty to disclose
37
the information.
Judge Wright also held Dirks liable to censure on a completely
separate ground. As a registrant, he held that Dirks was subject
to "myriad duties" not imposed on insiders or members of the
public. Although a "high standard of ethical behaviour" had
traditionally been imposed upon brokers in their dealings with
customers, it was also applicable "in their dealings with the SEC
and the public at large". 38 By acting as he did, Dirks ensured that
his clients would be protected and the loss would be borne by
smaller, less sophisticated investors. Judge Wright concluded that
"Dirks violated his duties to the SEC by failing to report
promptly what he knew." 39
Once again, the Supreme Court reversed and reiterated its
narrower, fiduciary theory of liability. Justice Powell, for the
majority, emphasized the court's holding in Chiarellathat there is
no duty to disclose where there is no fiduciary relationship. 40 And
he held that both the SEC's and the D.C. Circuit Court of
35 As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals noted, it was the custom of the industry that
Dirks' clients would compensate him by directing brokerage business, and hence
commissions, to his firm. See Dirks v. SEC, 681 F. 2d 824 (D.C. C.A. 1982), at p. 831.
36 Ibid.
37 Judge Wright held that Dirks' conduct fell within the holding as to tippees in Shapiro v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith Inc., 495 F. 2d 228 (2d Cir., 1974).
38 Dirks, supra, footnote 35 at p. 841.
39 Supra, footnote 35 at p. 842.

40 Included in the fiduciary category were those in a special confidential relationship
(underwriter, accountant, lawyer, etc.). See Dirks, supra, footnote 1 at p. 3261, note
14.
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Appeal's analysis of the matter was inconsistent with Chiarella

notwithstanding that Dirks had received his information from an
insider. 4 1 When then will liability attach to a tippee who trades, or
becomes a tipper? As the tippee's liability is derivative from the

insider's duty, there must be a breach by the insider of his
fiduciary duty not to disclose. And whether there is a breach by
the insider will depend on the purpose of the disclosure -

whether it was for the insider's direct or indirect personal advantage, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit. 42 As for
Dirks, he was not in a special, confidential relationship with
Equity Funding and there was no expectation that he would keep

the information secret. 43 As for Secrist, he received no monetary
or personal benefit for his disclosure, nor did he intend to make a
valuable, personal gift to Dirks. His purpose was to expose the

fraud. Accordingly, there was no breach of duty by the fiduciary/
tipper and thus no derivative breach by the tippee.
There is a good deal that can be said about the decisions in
Chiarella and Dirks from the particular angle of the interpretation and development of Rule 10b-5, but it would be of limited

interest or utility to Canadian securities practitioners and, in any
event, is a task better left to more knowledgeable American

commentators." What is relevant is the debate over the "equal
access" (or "information") theory as against the "fiduciary"
theory that runs through the cases, for the insider trading provisions of the OSA and the CBCA contain elements of both. As
noted above, little debate accompanied the broadening of the
scope of liability in both statutes 45 and as our corporate and
41There can be no doubt that Secrist, even though a former officer of Equity Funding, was
still subject to a duty not to disclose confidential information. See Canadian Aero
Service Ltd. v. O'Malley (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 371, [1974] S.C.R. 592.
42 See Dirks, supra, footnote 1 at p. 3265.
43 Quite the contrary; it was Secrist's hope and expectation that Dirks would expose the
fraud. See, supra, footnote 1 at p. 3268.
44 See the article by Langevoort, supra, footnote 19, for a critique of Chiarella. See also
Anderson, "Fraud, Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading", 10 Hof. L. Rev. 341 (1981-82).
The Supreme Court decision in Dirks is too recent for published comment, but is certain
to spawn a spate of notes and articles. For a broader discussion of securities fraud in the
United States, see Loss, supra, footnote 5, Chapter 9 ("Fraud and Manipulation") and
Chapter 9A ("Corporate Insiders").
45 The definitions in the CBCA, S.C. 1974-75, c. 33 and in the 1978 amendments, 1978-79,
c. 9, s. 38(1), were influenced by the writings of Professor Philip Anisman. See
Anisman, Takeover Bid Legislation In Canada: A Comparative Analysis (CCH, 1974),
pp. 108-41; Anisman, "Insider Trading under the Canada Business Corporations Act"
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securities laws are in a process of almost constant amendment, it
is well to consider the underlying justification for the legislation.
The fiduciary theory is obviously based on traditional notions

of the fidelity that an agent owes to his principal. If an agent,
whether in his capacity as director, trustee, partner, guardian or
broker breaches his trust, he is liable to account. The agent has

unjustly enriched himself (possibly, but not necessarily, at the
expense of the principal) and he must give up his unbargained-for
gain. If others knowingly participate in the breach, they hold

their gain on a constructive trust and must also account. With
respect to corporate fiduciaries, it is not much of a stretch of
equitable theory to hold that the duty is owed to the shareholders
as well as to the corporate principal. 46 Indeed, both the OSA and
CBCA provide liability to those
with whom the insider traded
47
and to the corporate principal.

Equity extended its tenets to a broad range of persons whom it

48
considered to occupy positions analagous to a fiduciary office.

The U.S. Supreme Court in Dirks characterized such persons as

"outsiders [who] may become fiduciaries ...[because] they have
entered into a special confidential relationship ... and are given
49
access to corporate information solely for corporate purposes".

Similarly, both the OSA and the CBCA include in their category
of defined insiders those who are employed or retained by 5a0
corporation and thereby acquire confidential information
(although it should be noted that the entire group of those so

defined in both statutes is broader than the U.S. Supreme Court's
"special confidential relationship" formulation). The problematic
in Meredith Memorial Lectures (1975), p. 151 at pp. 207-17. See also, Baillie, "The
Protection of the Investor in Ontario", 8 C. Pub. Administration 172 (1965), at pp.
254-8.
46 American jurisprudence has long held that directors and majority shareholders owe a
fiduciary duty to the shareholders; see Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939). For a
Canadian decision that expresses similar views see Goldex Mines Ltd. v. Revill, (1974),
54 D.L.R. (3d) 672, 7 O.R. (2d) 216 (C.A.); see also, Re R.J. Jowsey Mining Co. Ltd.
(1969), 6 D.L.R. (3d) 97. [196912 O.R. 549 (C.A.), per Laskin J.A.
47OSA, s. 131(1), (4); CBCA, s. 125(5)(a), (b).
48A. W. Scott, The Law of Trusts, (Boston, Little Brown, 3d ed. 1967), pp. 3412-13.
49 Dirks v. SEC, supra, footnote 1 at p. 3261, note 14. The SEC's General Counsel has
referred to footnote 14 of the Dirks decision as giving the Commission "a valuable new
tool" through the court's "theory of the constructive insider": B.N.A., Securities
Regulation and Law Report, Vol. 15, no. 38, p. 1821. The creation of constructive
insiders is precisely the purpose of ss. 75(3) and 131(7) of the OSA and s. 125(1)(e) of
the CBCA.
50 OSA, ss. 73(3), 131(7); CBCA, s. 125(l)(e).
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area in insider trading is at the margin where traditional equitable
doctrine does not readily supply the answer. Absent a breach by a
fiduciary, by a knowing or reckless participant or by one in a
special, confidential relationship, what ought to be the response
of the law to those who trade with knowledge of material, nonpublic information? That was the real issue raised in Chiarella,
although not satisfactorily answered by the Supreme Court as the
majority felt constrained by the "fraud" terminology of Rule 10b5. It was also the issue raised in Dirks, although one might have
thought that the application of traditional fiduciary doctrine
51
would have supplied the answer.
The scope of the rule that one opts for in insider trading
depends upon the rationale chosen to justify its prohibition. The
most thorough and, to my mind, persuasive analysis of the issues
is Professor Victor Brudney's. 52 Insider trading prohibitions5 3 are
primarily designed to protect the investing public from those who
possess an informational advantage. The focus is on the
unfairness created in the market-place rather than on the abuse of
position by a fiduciary. To be sure, the felt unfairness of insider
trading is that a position has been abused for personal gain, but
the overriding purpose of the legislation is to protect through
prohibiting rather than to punish. 54 A secondary purpose is that
of efficiency, to ensure a full, free flow of information into the
market so that price will reflect value and resources will be
optimally allocated. But as Brudney points out, other securities
law provisions relating to prospectus filings, proxies and information circulars, periodic financial reporting and continuous
55
disclosure of material changes more directly serve that function.
51This point will be discussed further, infra.
52Brudney, "Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under The Federal
Securities Laws", 93 Har. L. Rev. 322 (1979); see also Anderson, supra, footnote 44;
Scott, "Insider Trading, Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy", 9 J. Leg. Stud.
801 (1980). For an analysis that is supportive of the case for the primacy of efficient
markets, see Dooley, supra, footnote 5. See also, Easterbrook, "Insider Trading, Secret
Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information", [1981] Supr. Ct.
Rev. 309, at pp. 314-39.
53Professor Brudney deals with Rule lOb-5, the "antifraud provisions", which I characterize for purposes of analogy to Canadian legislation as the "insider trading
prohibitions".
54 This viewpoint is stated more strongly in this article than it is in Brudney's article.
55 It is doubtful that insider trading prohibitions have any real effect on allocative efficiency. There is very little evidence in the cases that announcements were delayed so that
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A third purpose, effected in conjunction with the disclosure
provisions, is regulatory. The greater the disclosure requirements
and the more stringent the rules against self-dealing, the less
temptation there will be to act, and to cause the corporation to
act, in ways that will facilitate personal gain.
In terms of insiders and all those in a confidential relationship,
Brudney's analysis led him to the conclusion that the disclose or
abstain rule is based not only on notions of fidelity and efficiency,
but also on considerations of equity.5 6 His much-quoted insight
was to the effect that the informational advantage that an insider
possesses cannot lawfully be acquired (without the corporation's
consent) by those with whom he deals. The unfairness inheres not
in having more information, but in having information to which
an outsider is barred access. This Brudney referred to as an
"unerodable informational advantage". And the same considerations would bar trading if what was possessed was market
information 57 rather than corporate information, regardless of
whether the information was obtained by insiders in their
capacity as such. Those who are not insiders but who receive their
information from an insider -

tippees -

are placed in the same

position with respect to trading as their informers. A tippee
cannot trade without disclosing as he knows that the information
is confidential and that his informant is barred from using it for
his own advantage. And an insider cannot benefit 58 through
selective disclosure - tipping -

rather than through trading.

But who, apart from insiders and those in a special confidential
relationship and tippees, should be subject to the disclose or
abstain rule? If the right to trade is not to be denied to all who
possess an informational advantage, where is the line to be drawn
and on the basis of what principle? The answer is again based on
the inability of third parties to overcome lawfully the superior
knowledge of those with whom they trade. From the perspective
of a buyer or seller of securities it makes no difference whether
the person with whom they trade, and who possesses confidential
information that is not reflected in the price, is an insider or an
insiders would have an opportunity to trade; see Dooley, supra, footnote 5 at pp. 36-7.
Moreover, what delays there are, are very short-term.
56 Brudney, supra, footnote 52 at p. 346.
57 See supra, footnote 25.
58 Brudney likens tipping to selling the information for something of value, whether cash,
reciprocal information, status or prestige; Brudney, op. cit., footnote 52 at p. 348.
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outsider. They have traded in a market where the other party
possessed information that was not legally available to them.
That is the "inherent unfairness" of Cady, Roberts59 and the
rationale for "limiting the trading privileges available to such an
exclusive possessor of information". 60 Moreover, the rule of
disclose or abstain is argued to have a functional base as well as
being grounded in notions of inherent unfairness. If trading
markets are perceived to regularly contain those who trade with
inside information, many will refrain from dealing in those
markets altogether, or will demand a risk premium
for so dealing,
61
both of which effects will raise the cost of capital.
The theory of equal access is not an egalitarian one. The
argument is not for equality of information in the market-place,
although the on-going drive for continuous disclosure is toward
that elusive goal and is to be fostered. The Supreme Court in
Dirks expressed concern about the important role of the analyst
but appeared to confuse. equality of information with access to
confidential information. 62 Analysts are to be encouraged in their
work of exploring, appraising and projecting. The faster their
insights are translated into market activity, the more efficient that
market will be. If they have more pieces of information and are
able to construct a more accurate picture, they and their
customers are entitled to profit thereby. The benefits that accrue
to the market-place from the activity of financial analysts are
argued to outweigh the costs of allowing them to capitalize on
their informational advantages. 63 What analysts may not do is
trade on or transmit information which they know to be
confidential and non-public. The line at times may be a fine one,
but those who are market professionals should not have too much
difficulty in recognizing the boundary.
The need to encourage the pursuit of discovery values is the
justification for allowing a takeover bidder to purchase securities
when he knows that within a short time he will make a public bid
at a price above the current market. An impending takeover bid
is the classic example of market information, and as Professor
Loss has noted "there is no reason in either principle or in case
59Ibid., at p. 355.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., at p. 356.
62 Dirks, supra, footnote I at p. 3263.
63 See Brudney, supra, footnote 52 at p. 341.
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law ...to distinguish between information that is intrinsic to the

company and market information that will not affect the
company's assets or earning power". 64 If the "efficient capital
market hypothesis" is correct, as it has been argued to be, 65 the
price of a security will reflect its value in the sense that it will
reflect all available information. As information becomes known,
even if only through the trading activities of insiders, the price
will move towards the correct one.66 Underpriced or overpriced

securities will fairly quickly be identified and corrections will be
made. Why then would a takeover bidder pay a premium, often a
substantial premium, over the value of a security?
The answer6 7 is that the offeror's research has disclosed

something in the offeree company that makes it think it can use
the offeree's assets to earn a greater return. This may be through
management changes, different production processes, more
efficient use of assets, including disposals, benefits from a merged

operation, financial restructuring, tax savings and synergy gains.
Both individual shareholders and the general economy gain from
such activity. The informational advantage that an offeror has is
the knowledge that he is willing to pay more for the security than
the current price. That informational advantage is not one that
has to be shared with the public.
productive to require it to be as
preneurs from seeking unexploited
rewards of and recompense for
68
discovery.

And it would be counterit would discourage entrevalues by denying them the
the costs of research and

64See Loss, supra, footnote 5 at pp. 852-3, note 72. See also Fleischer, et al., supra,
footnote 25; Anisman, "Insider Trading Under The Canada Business Corporations
Act", supra, footnote 45 at pp. 226-7.
65See generally, J. Lorie and M. Hamilton, The Stock Market: Theories and Evidence
(1973), pp. 70-98; Fama, "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work", 25 J. Finance 383 (1970); Note, "The Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis", 29 Stan. L. Rev. 1031 (1977), at pp. 1034-57.
66 This is the rationale for the mandatory continuous disclosure requirement of s. 74 of the
OSA.
67 See Easterbrook and Fischel, "The Proper Role of A Target's Management In
Responding To A Tender Offer", 94 Har. L. Rev. 1161 (1980-81), at pp. 1165-74.
68 Ibid. (In citing Easterbrook and Fischel, I do not want to be taken to be agreeing with
their principal thesis with respect to the harmful effects of defence tactics.) The
demands of disclosure and considerations of fairness call for limits on an offeror's ability
to silently acquire control. Thus limits of 5% in the United States (s. 13(d) of the 1934
Act), 10% under the CBCA (s. 122(3)), and 20% under the OSA (s. 103) are set at
which disclosure or accelerated disclosure is required. The level for insider reporting
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While a prospective offeror may purchase with impunity, 69 its

directors and officers may not. Thus under both the OSA 70 and
CBCA 7t directors and senior officers of a company that becomes

an insider of another company are deemed to have been an
72
insider of that other company for the previous six months.

There is no incongruity in allowing the principal to trade while
denying that right to its agents. The agent acquires the information for the benefit and use of his principal and, apart from the
strictures of fiduciary doctrine, there is no economic justification
for allowing such insiders to profit from their informational
advantage at the expense of public investors. The same
arguments apply to "warehousing" which is proscribed in the
CBCA, 73 but escapes restraint under the OSA. 74 Warehousing is
under both the OSA and CBCA is 10% and the takeover bid trigger is 10% under the
CBCA and 20% under the OSA unless, in either case, the bid is exempt. The insider
reporting requirements enable an offeror to silently acquire 9.9% under the CBCA and
19.9% under the OSA.
69 An offeror may not purchase without disclosing under the CBCA if it receives
confidential information from officers of the offeree corporation during pre-bid negotiations as it would then be an insider by reason of s. 125(1)(f). That is not the case under
the OSA. As Anisman notes, the majority of takeover bids are negotiated: Anisman,
"Insider Trading Under the Canada Business Corporations Act", supra, footnote 45 at
p. 268, note 679.
70
S. 1(8).
71S. 121(3)(a). Under the CBCA the same rule applies where two companies enter into a
"business combination" which is an acquisition of all or substantially all of the property
of one by the other, or an amalgamation involving both of them; see CBCA, s. 121(4).
72 The directors and senior officers of the second company are similarly deemed to be
insiders of the first company for the previous six months; see OSA, s. 1(9); CBCA, s.
121(3)(b). In both cases, the period is six months or such shorter period that one has
been a director or senior officer.
73 Warehousing would result in civil liability under s. 125(5) by reason of the combined
effect of s. 125(1)(f) and s. 125(3)(a). An insider includes a person who receives
"specific confidential information" (which I interpret to include market information)
from a "person described ... in subsection (3)." Subsection (3)(a) deems directors and
senior officers of the offeror (those who would furnish the information to the institutional investor) to have been insiders of the offeree for the previous six months. The
amendment of s. 125(1) in 1978 was based on Anisman's critique of the legislation; see
Anisman, "Insider Trading Under The Canada Business Corporations Act", supra,
footnote 45 at pp. 207-34.
74 Under the OSA, s. 75(1)(b), informing with respect to a material fact is prohibited by
those in a special relationship. Under s. 75(3)(a), insiders are in a special relationship
and under s. 1(8) directors and officers of the offeror are deemed to be insiders of the
offeree for the previous six months. Thus there would be criminal (s. 118) and civil
liability (s. 131) for informing an institutional investor of an intention to make a bid.
The intention to make a bid would be "material fact" within s. 1(1)22. There is a gap,
however, in that the tippee, the institutional investor, is not caught under s. 75 or s. 131;
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the giving of advance notice to institutional investors of an
intention to make a bid for a particular security on the understanding that the investor will purchase and hold the security. The
offeror is thus assured of a number of large blocks being tendered

to it when the bid is announced and the institutions are assured of
a profit. Although the arguments that are made to justify pre-bid

trading by the offeror might seem to justify warehousing, the
opportunity for further tipping, aided by the offeror's inability to
police his tippees, and the increased number of investors who
would be induced to sell by the market activity and likely rising

price, argue for its prohibition. These considerations presumably
led the
SEC to ban warehousing by the passage of Rule 14e-3 in
75
1980.

The arguments set out above for extending the disclose or
abstain rule beyond the traditional categories of insiders to "outsiders" who possess material non-public information are not

widely accepted. The major securities law codification projects in
the United States and Canada both skirted around the issue. The
American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code does not
extend liability beyond corporate insiders, those given access to
inside information, and their tippees. 76 For other cases, the Code

resorts to an ad hoc fairness test by inviting the courts to rely on

the Code's anti-fraud prohibition 77 (similar to Rule 10b-5) "to the
extent that a sufficiently egregious or shocking or offensive case

of trading while silent cannot be rationalized on an 'insider'

analysis". 78 The Proposals for a Securities Market Law for
Canada do not discuss the issue directly 79 except to note that the
there is no equivalent of the CBCA's s. 125(1)(f). Thus investors who are tipped may
purchase without disclosing and without fear of liability. Clearly, an amendment to the
OSA is required to deal with tippee liability. See, Anisman, "Insider Trading Under the
Canada Business Corporations Act", supra, footnote 45 at pp. 269-70.
7517 C.F.R. s. 240.14e-3 (1980). See Loss, supra, footnote 5 at pp. 868-9.
76 Fed. Sec. Code, s. 1603(a), (b) (1980). The Code does not prohibit tipping but rather
treats it as a matter for civil liability. The inclusion of "indirect", or remote tippees in s.
1603(b)(4) makes the coverage very broad and would catch most of those whom one
would consider to be outsiders.
77Ibid., s. 1602(a)(1).
78Ibid., Comment (3)(d) to s. 1603(a), (b); Loss, supra, footnote 5 at p. 852. Comment
(3)(d) notes that s. 1603 "reflects no universally applicable theory of 'market
egalitarianism' ", and that "this area must be left to further judicial development". The
Comment also notes that although it would be convenient to have a new category of
"quasi-insider" to cover the outsider who is not a tippee, the matter "does not lend itself
to definition". The Code's solution is a broad category of defined insiders and a general
anti-fraud provision similar to Rule lob-5 (s.1602).
79Anisman et al., 2 Proposalsfor a Securities Market Law for Canada (1979), pp. 218-23
(hereafter "the Proposals").
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definition of insider that it employs is broader than the OSA and
is based directly on the CBCA with the important addition of a
residual category that includes those whose relationship to a
company gives them access to confidential information. 8° While
the precision and breadth of the definitions in s. 12.0281 of the
Proposalsare admirable, it is a matter of regret that neither they
nor the Code deal directly with the "inherent unfairness" theory
advanced by Brudney.
What result would the application of the inherent unfairness
theory lead to in Chiarella and Dirks? Chiarella is the more
difficult case as the printer was an outsider who had no direct
connection with the offeror-principal. His employment, however,
gave him regular access to inside information. He was thus in a
position to acquire and use, in breach of his duty to his employer,
confidential information. That information was not available to
and could not legally be acquired by those in the market-place
with whom Chiarella dealt as long as the offeror wished to keep it
confidential. Accordingly, he possessed an "unerodable informational advantage" and should have been held liable.
Dirks is an easier case, both because Dirks was a market
professional, a registrant, and because he was a classic tippee. His
information came from someone he knew to be an insider and he
used that information, after confirmation, to his advantage and to
the detriment of those who purchased from his tippees. Although
market-place purchasers could be said to have been able to
acquire lawfully the non-public information in the sense that a
company may not assert a claim of confidentiality with respect to
its own fraud, the reality was that they (as opposed to a market
professional) had no way of acquiring the information to which
the tippers and the tippees were privy. Accordingly, liability
should have been imposed on Secrist, Dirks and the institutional
sellers. Dirks also should have been held liable on the alternative
ground given by Judge Wright in the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals. Dirks was a registrant and as such is held to a high
standard of ethics in dealing with the market-place. On that
ground alone he ought to have been held liable as his conduct
80 Ibid., p. 219. This category, along with the inclusion of indirect tippees in s.
12.02(1)(vi), casts the net very wide and would catch most cases of trading with material
non-public information.
81 1 Proposals, s. 12.02, pp. 75-6.
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ensured that investors purchased securities at prices far above

those that would have obtained if he had seen that his information was promptly disseminated.
What would be the result in Dirks and Chiarella under the

provisions of the OSA and CBCA? Chiarella would not be an
insider under the OSA as he was not in a special relationship with
a reporting issuer under s. 75(3).82 His employer engaged in

business activities (s. 75(3)(c)) with the offeror but it is the
offeree who is the reporting issuer whose shares were purchased.
Even if the employer was in a special relationship with the
offeree, and its associates therefore included by s. 75(3)(d), the
definition of associate in s. 1(1)2 does not include an employee
(although it does include a partner).
The case with respect to Chiarella under the CBCA is similar to

that under the OSA. Under s. 125(1)(e) 83 insider includes a
person employed or retained by the corporation, but Chiarella
was employed by the printing company, not by the offeree. For
civil liability under s. 125(5) the insider must engage in "a transaction in a security of the corporation" of which he is an insider.
Nor did Chiarella become an insider of the offeree by virtue of
82 OSA, s. 75(3):
(3) For the purposes of this section, a person or company is in a special relationship
with a reporting issuer where,
(a) the person or company is an insider or an affiliate of the reporting issuer;
(b) the person is a director, officer or employee of the reporting issuer or of
a company that is an insider or an affiliate of the reporting issuer;
(c) the person or company has engaged, is engaging in or proposes to
engage in any business or professional activities with or on behalf of the
reporting issuer and thereby has acquired knowledge of the material fact
or material change; or
(d) the person or company is an associate of the reporting issuer or of any
person or company referred to in clause (a), (b) or (c).
83 CBCA, s. 125(1):
(1) In this section "insider" means, with respect to a corporation,
(a) the corporation;
(b) an affiliate of the corporation;
(c) a director or an officer of the corporation;
(d) a person who beneficially owns more than ten per cent of the shares of
the corporation or who exercises control or direction over more than ten
per cent of the votes attached to the shares of the corporation;
(e) a person employed or retained by the corporation; and
(I) a person who receives specific confidential information from a person
described in this subsection or in subsection (3), including a person
described in this paragraph, and who has knowledge that the person
giving the information is a person described in this subsection or in
subsection (3), including a person described in this paragraph.
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the tippee provision of s. 125(1)(f). Under subsec. 125(3), the
directors and officers of the offeror and offeree are deemed to
have been insiders of each other for the previous six months. But
Chiarella was not a person who received specific confidential
information from a person described in subsec. (3) because the
person he received the information from, albeit indirectly, was
the offeror corporation that retained the printing company. The
information did not come from, and was not received from, a
director or officer of the offeror who became a deemed insider of
the offeree.
Dirks presents a more interesting case, particularly under the
OSA. Dirks was a tipper and s. 75(1)(b) makes it an offence to tip
and s. 131(1) imposes civil liability on a tipper, if in a special
relationship, when his tippee trades. But was Dirks in a special
relationship with Equity Funding? The only possibility would be
to argue that Dirks "engaged in ... any business or professional

activities with or on behalf of the reporting issuer" within s.
75(3)(c). The case could be made that Dirks, as a securities
analyst, was engaging in a professional activity with Equity
Funding when he investigated its affairs. That could be said to be
the case every time an analyst deals with a listed company, even
though the company has not retained him. It might also be argued
that the activity is "on behalf of" the reporting issuer as it is to an
issuer's advantage to be open to analysts, even if the ultimate
report is not always to its liking. The case is far from clear (some
contractual relationship may be required) but it is certainly
arguable .84

The case with respect to Dirks is not clear under the CBCA.
He was neither "employed or retained" by Equity Funding. 85 But
under s. 125(1)(f) a tippee who receives his information from "a
director or an officer" of the corporation is a deemed insider.
Secrist was an officer of an affiliate of Equity Funding, but he had
been fired. While he may still carry his obligation of confiden84 Secrist would be liable as a tipper under s. 75(l)(b) if he could be held to still carry his
obligation of confidentiality after he left Equity Funding's employ; see CanadianAero
Service Ltd. v. O'Malley (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 371, [1974] S.C.R. 592. It might be
difficult to contend that there was an obligation of confidentiality with respect to
knowledge of a corporate fraud. Certainly, there could be no complaint about general
disclosure. The wrong is in selective disclosure of material information that Secrist
knew, and intended, would be used for trading purposes.
85 S.125(1)(e).
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tiality at common law, 85a it may be difficult to contend that Dirks
received his information from "an officer" when Secrist was no
longer employed by Equity Funding when he tipped. On the
other hand, should a court be receptive to the argument that an
insider is relieved of his statutory liability the moment he leaves
the company's employment? The obligation of confidentiality
remains with him and that is an interpretation of s. 125 that would
fulfil the deterrent policy of the provision. The overriding consideration should be Secrist's status at the time he became privy to
the information and he was clearly an insider at that time. Thus,
Dirks would be a deemed insider by virtue of having received his
information from someone he knew to have acquired the information at the time that person was an insider and who was in a
continuing fiduciary relationship with Equity Funding.
The Ontario Securities Commission has made it clear in
Danuke86 that it will discipline a registrant who uses or communicates material, non-public information even though such registrant is not in a "special relationship" under the OSA. 87 In echoes
of Judge Wright's holding in Dirks, the Commission held that the
actions of a registrant who uses inside information are "contrary
to the public interest and fall below the standard of conduct that
may reasonably be expected". Suspensions were imposed on all
87
those involved. a
It is likely that the OSC would take a different view of the
matter than did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co. 88 The defendant registrant
was retained by a client to find a suitable takeover target and
selected Olinkraft Corporation. Olinkraft co-operated and gave
Morgan confidential internal earnings projections "for the
purposes of the bid". The bid did not take place and when
85a See CanadianAero Service Ltd. v. O'Malley, supra, footnote 84.
86 (1981), 2 OSC Bull. 31C. For a discussion of U.S. cases dealing with the liability of
market professionals, see Jacobs, "The Impact of Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5
on Brokers-Dealers", 57 Cor. L. Rev. 869 (1972), at pp. 905-12 and pp. 966-72.
87 It is not clear from the judgment whether the panel appreciated that Danuke and her
companions were not, in fact, within the terms of s. 75. The conclusion of the judgment
appears to state, erroneously, that they were within s. 75. The sense of the judgment
does not, however, depend upon a showing of a breach of s. 75.
87a In Moss, supra, footnote 30, the Second Circuit noted that Judge Wright's remarks in
Dirks were in the context of a SEC enforcement action and declined to hold that registrants have special fiduciary duties of disclosure to the market-place.
88 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir., 1980).
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another company bid $51, Morgan's arbitrage department
purchased some 143,000 shares because it was confident a
competing bid would be made at a higher price. Morgan then
disclosed the financial information to Johns-Manville "to induce
it to make a substantially higher offer" and Johns-Manville
ultimately made a successful bid at $65. In a derivative action by
an Olinkraft shareholder, the Second Circuit held that Morgan
owed no duty to observe confidentiality. The reasoning of the
majority was that Morgan and Olinkraft were acting at arm's
length; Morgan was responsible to its clients and Olinkraft to its
shareholders and the receipt of confidential information did not
change those relationships. Olinkraft may have placed its
but
confidence in Morgan not to disclose the information,
89
"Morgan owed no duty to observe that confidence".
Judge Oakes dissented on the ground that the obligations of a
fiduciary attached to Morgan once it was given information on the
understanding and expectation that it would remain confidential
and was accepted on that basis. 9° It could not thereafter disclose
the information without Olinkraft's permission. In similar
circumstances, one would expect the OSC to hold, as in Danuke,
that such conduct "falls below the standard .

.

. that may

reasonably be expected of registrants". Morgan's conduct would
also be a breach of the OSA if it occurred in Ontario. Morgan
engaged in business activities with Olinkraft (the reporting issuer)
within s. 75(3)(c) and therefore was in a special relationship with
it. If the financial information was a material fact, there would be
a breach of s. 75(1)(b) and civil liability under s. 131(1). This
seems like the proper result as it does not matter, from the
perspective of the market-place, how or for what purpose a
tippee acquires material, non-public information which he knows
to be such.
Subsequent to the decisions in Chiarella and Dirks, the SEC
has brought four cases, each of which is now pending in the
courts. I propose to look at each of the cases in the context of the
provisions of the OSA and the CBCA, and in the context of the
equal access theory set out above.
1. A person in a football stadium overheard confidential
information being discussed by two people sitting in front of him
89 Ibid., at p. 799.
90 Ibid., at p. 801.
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and traded on it. 91 The eavesdropper apparently knew that one of

the individuals was president of the company and he understood
that what he heard was both material and confidential. In those
circumstances, there would be liability under the CBCA but not
under the OSA. Under s. 125(1)(f) of the CBCA, the eavesdropper would have received specific confidential information
from someone he knew to be an officer of the corporation. 91a For
liability under s. 125(5), he would have made use of the information by trading on the basis of it and, as it concerned the liquidation of the company, it was information that if generally known
"might reasonably be expected to affect materially the value of
the security".
There would be no liability under the OSA as there is no
provision similar to s. 125(1)(f) of the CBCA which covers
tippees. The equal access theory, as expounded by Brudney,
would, it is suggested, impose liability. The eavesdropper is in
much the same position as the printer in Chiarella. It is true that
he was not in a position that gave him regular access to
confidential information as was the printer, nor did he breach any
duty by using the information, as did Chiarella to his employer.
But if he knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the information is confidential and further knows that the person he is
listening to is a director or officer of the company, then he
possesses an informational advantage that those with whom he
trades cannot lawfully acquire. There is an inherent unfairness in
trading in those circumstances and liability should follow. The
case is certainly one that tests the equal access theory - it would
not fall within the Second Circuit's holding in Chiarella, but it is
hard to see why the line should be drawn to exclude someone
who, to his knowledge, possesses and uses material, confidential
information.
2. A financial printer purchased, but never sold, shares based
on information with respect to a takeover bid that he obtained
during his work. The SEC seeks disgorgement of the paper
profits. This is the same case as Chiarellabut is being brought by
the SEC to get an answer to the question left open in that case as
91SEC v. Plart (DC WOkla), 15 B.N.A. Secs. Reg. and Law Report 393 (1983).
91a The sense and purpose of s. 125(1) do not require that a tippee be given or offered the
information to be taken to have received it. It is only necessary to show that he came
into possession of it.
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to whether a breach of duty to one's employer will supply the
necessary "fraud" for 10b-5 liability for insider trading. 92 As
noted above, there would be no liability under the OSA or
CBCA, but there would be liability under the equal access
theory.
3. A word processor operator in a law firm allegedly came into
possession of inside information with respect to takeover bids. He
both traded and tipped. 93 The case is similar to the one above,
with the breach of duty to the employer being the essential link to
Rule 10b-5. There would be no liability under the OSA. The law
firm is in a special relationship with the client under s. 75(3)(c), as
are its associates under s. 75(3)(d). Associate is defined 94 to
include partners but does not include employees and the
secretary is therefore free of liability. In any event, the "reporting
issuer" would be the offeree, not the offeror who retained the law
firm.
Liability under the CBCA would depend upon from whom the
secretary could be said to have "received" the information under
s. 125(1)(f). The argument is the same as that set out above with
respect to a CBCA analysis of Chiarella.Under s. 125(3) it is the
directors and officers of the offeror who are deemed to be insiders
of the offeree for the previous six months (and vice versa). The
offeror does not become an insider of the offeree until its
holdings reach 10%. While it is the offeror who retains the law
firm, the information will invariably be supplied to one of its
members, most often orally, by the offeror's directors or senior
officers. Given the tippee chain set up by s. 125(1)(f), the
secretary would have received the information from a deemed
insider and would be liable. In that respect, the case is different
from a printer receiving a takeover bid circular which is the
circular of the offeror. If the information with respect to the client
did not concern a takeover bid and the client's shares were the
relevant ones for trading and tipping, there would be liability
92 SEC v. Materia (DC SNY), 14 B.N.A. Secs. Reg. and Law Report 1685 (1982). An
affirmative answer was given in U.S. v. Newman, supra, footnote 30. Materia was found
to have breached Rule lOb-5 by misappropriating the information, in breach of his duty,
from his employer: 15 B.N.A. Secs. Reg. and Law Report 2231 (1983).
93 SEC v. Madan (DC SNY), 15 B.N.A. Secs. Reg. and Law Report 1349 (1983). Information allegedly was used concerning 29 separate corporate transactions with profits in
excess of $2.6 million.
94
OSA,s. 1(1)2.
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under the CBCA by reason of the tippee inclusion in s. 125(1)(f).
There would be no liability under the OSA as employees are not
included in the definition of those in a special relationship and
there is no tippee liability. There would be liability under the
argued-for equal access theory as the secretary would know
where the information originated and that it was material and
non-public.
4. A group of unrelated people in brokerage firms traded in
securities of companies that were involved in takeover bids. 95 The
only common link was that a law firm was involved in all the bids
but the SEC has not been able to identify a tipper or establish that
the law firm was the source of the information. The SEC does not
believe that it is necessary for it to establish the identity of the
tipper. If the information came from someone in a special
confidential relationship and the tippees knew that, or that is a
reasonable inference from the evidence, there would likely be
liability under Rule 10b-5.
Under the OSA there would be no liability as there is no tippee
liability even if it can be shown that the tip came from one in a
special relationship as defined. If the tipper was identified as a
partner in the law firm there would be liability on him under s.
75(1)(b), but not if the tipper were an employee.
There is tippee liability under s. 125(1)(f) of the CBCA, but the
tip would have to come from a partner who received his information from a director or officer of the offeror. The initial tip must
come from an insider and a chain of infinite tippee links is then
established. If the tip came from an employee, then the case is
like the one argued above; it depends upon from whom the
employee received the information. While there is tippee liability
under the CBCA, it is not clear that there is tipper liability.
Section 125(5) imposes civil liability (insider trading is not an
offence under the CBCA) on an insider who "makes use of ... for

his own benefit or advantage". While the benefit or advantage to
a tipper may not always be immediately apparent, it should not
be too difficult in most cases to establish a personal reason for the
tip that will satisfy the statutory test. 96 There clearly would be
liability on the tipper and tippees under the equal access theory.
95 SEC v. Musella (DC SNY), 15 B.N.A. Secs. Reg. and Law Report 138 (1983). After the
SEC filed its affidavit, the tippee was identified as the office manager of the New York
law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell.
96 See, Anisman, "Insider Trading Under The Canada Business Corporations Act",
supra, footnote 45 at p. 223.
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An analysis of Chiarellaand Dirks and subsequent SEC actions
in the context of the OSA and CBCA provisions suggests the

need for major amendments to the OSA 96a and some tightening in
the CBCA. Indeed, amendments should be considered to make
liability consistent with the equal access theory proposed by

Professor Brudney. At the least this would require the inclusion
of an employee of anyone engaged in a business or professional
activity with a reporting issuer under s. 75(1)(c) of the OSA. It is
not sensible to include employees of a reporting issuer under s.
75(3)(b) and to exclude employees under s. 75(3)(c). This one

change would cover many of the situations of "exploiting the
employer's special relationship with its clients" that recently have
been brought to light.
As to tippers and tippees, there should be a clear statement of

tippee liability in the OSA and the subject of tipping should be
dealt with in a separate provision in the CBCA. Both statutes
should also refer to former as well as present directors, officers
and employees. If the matter is still confidential, a former
fiduciary should continue to be held to a statutory duty of

refraining from trading or tipping. None of the above changes
would necessarily catch the eavesdropping football fan and
consideration should be given to whether or not it is desirable to

make the statute stretch to cover that and similar cases. Given the
definitional difficulties of including "outsiders", perhaps the best

solution is that found in s. 12.02 of the Proposals. Section 12.02
includes a net for "any other person" whose relationship to the
issuer gives him access to confidential information and the tippee
clause includes all secondary tippees. Registrants should be
included as defined insiders in both statutes as they should be

subject to civil and criminal liability for insider trading apart from
96a This article is not intended as a detailed review of insider trading legislation and,

accordingly, has not dealt with such important questions as the interpretation of key
terms such as "specific", "confidential", "material" and "make use of'. The leading
cases in Ontario are Green v. Charterhouse Group Canada Ltd. (1976), 68 D.L.R. (3d)
592, 12 O.R. (2d) 280 (C.A.) and Re Connor, [19761 OSC Bull. 149. See also F. H.
Buckley, "How to Do Things with Inside Information", 2 C.B.L.J. 343 (1977-78); J. C.
Baillie and V. P. Alboini, "The National Sea Decision - Exploring the Parameters of
Administrative Discretion", 2 C.B. L.J. 454 (1977-78); Anisman, "Insider Trading
Under the Canada Business Corporations Act", supra, footnote 45 at pp. 217-34. The
most contentious issue is in the interpretation of "make use of". The Proposals argue
that its interpretation "may not unreasonably be said to have led to an incorrect result
in every case in which it has been considered": see 2 Proposals, p. 221. Accordingly, s.
12.02 of the Proposals does not include the defence and the prohibition is based solely
on the knowledge of a material confidential fact. There is much to be said for deleting
the defence from the OSA.
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any disciplinary action that may be taken by the OSC or Toronto
Stock Exchange.
Finally, a word against what has been argued for above; or at
least a word against an enforcement policy in pursuit of equal
access. What evidence there is suggests that insider trading is
pervasive,97 and yet the number of cases that have been brought

in this country and in the United States is miniscule. Where there
is a conviction the penalties, if any, are trivial. 98 What this tells us
is that insider trading offences are very difficult to detect and any
serious enforcement programme would require such a disproportionate part of the OSC's scarce resources as, in effect, to be a
misallocation of those resources. There are more serious
enforcement problems that require attention. Moreover, neither
the judiciary nor the trading public appear to view insider trading
as a serious offence, if one can judge from attitudes and penalties.
Perhaps when the very foundation of an industry is information,
those who have and use more or better information, even if it is
confidential, are not regarded as serious wrongdoers.
All of this is not to say that insider trading ought not to be an
offence or that the law in this area, as has been argued, should
not be as rational and as equitable as is possible. The case for
equal access appears to me to be a strong one. In terms of
enforcement, however, the concentration should be on serious
abuses by traditional insiders. They are the front line fiduciaries,
the sources of insider information, and the ones who stand to gain
the most from its improper appropriation. Greater attention
should be paid to an analysis of their required reports, particularly at a time of significant corporate events, and enforcement
should be on a scale considerably greater than that exhibited in
the OSC's recent pronouncements in Noranda Mines Inc. 99 and in
Joseph Burnett.100 Concentration on directors and senior officers
would be a rational use of resources and a policy that is most
likely to pay enforcement and deterrence dividends.
97 Dooley, supra, footnote 5 at pp. 5-7. SEC officials have been quoted to the effect that
insider trading is rampant: see New York Times (March 7, 1980).
98 Dooley, supra, footnote 5 at pp. 10-15. The first criminal conviction for insider trading
under the OSA was recorded on October 4, 1983. The President of Falconbridge
Copper pleaded guilty to purchasing the Company's shares prior to the issuance of a
press release which announced significant drill hole results. He was fined $250: see The
Globe and Mail (Toronto, October 5, 1983), at p. 81. See also Herman, "Equity
Funding, Insider Information, and The Regulators", 21 U.C.L.A. Law Rev. 1 (197374), at pp. 21-8. Professor Herman's article is a particularly thought-provoking one that
puts the Equity Funding case in a different perspective.
99 (1983), 6 OSC Bull. 2740.
100 Ibid., at p. 2751.

